Local Pipeline Safety Policy
Model Pipeline Ordinances
In March 2000, in response to the Olympic Pipe Line Company accident in Bellingham, Washington State enacted new pipeline safety laws. Among the new initiatives are provisions that required the State's Municipal Research Council to develop and periodically update model pipeline safety ordinances for use by local governments. The Pipeline Safety Trust thanks the Council and the Washington Cities and Counties Pipeline Safety Consortium for its continuing work on these issues. We also invite individuals and organizations anywhere to let us know of other efforts by local governments to increase pipeline safety.
Introduction to Model Pipeline Ordinances
Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill 2420 (pdf), passed by the 2000 legislature, required the Municipal Research Council to develop and periodically update, for consideration by local governments:
The task of drafting the documents was entrusted to Municipal Research & Services Center. Over the past year we have worked with representatives of concerned local governments in this state to produce documents that should provide a basis for responsible local government regulation of transmission pipelines in the State of Washington.
As noted in the legislation, these documents will need to be periodically updated. Input from pipeline industry representatives, local governments, and regulatory agencies will provide assistance for future modifications.
The model franchise agreement benefited from recent legal work done on this issue by representatives of the city attorney's office of the City of Bellingham, as well as input from the Washington City and County Pipeline Safety Consortium. Particular thanks should go to attorney David Kerr, working for the City of Bellevue.
Some wording in the documents will need to be modified slightly if utilized by counties rather than cities.
Some comments concerning the minimal setback requirement in the model ordinance for hazardous liquid pipelines may help to explain the vast difference between setbacks for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The danger zone adjoining a natural gas pipeline is easier to quantify. When a natural gas pipeline ruptures and ignites, the blast and heat are centered at the point of rupture, and the size of the pipe and the pressure under which the gas is pumped provides a way to calculate the adjoining impacted area. As was so tragically evident in the June, 1999 Bellingham incident, topography plays a major role in hazardous liquid pipeline leaks or ruptures: a large quantity of hazardous liquid can swiftly flow downhill before igniting. Fifty feet on the uphill side of a hazardous liquid pipeline can be a relatively safe location during a rupture, but distant locations on the downhill side may be in jeopardy. Because of that topographical factor, setbacks alone are not adequate to protect the public. Third-party damage is frequently the cause of hazardous liquid pipeline incidents, so one number locator services and requirements for properly locating and signing pipeline corridors are crucial. Those factors can be addressed in a franchise agreement.
The report that is referred to in the model setback ordinance, "A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas Associated with Natural Gas Pipelines," by Mark J. Stephens, may be borrowed from the MRSC Library by Washington local government officials.
